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Safety Challenges for a South Texas Spaceport
By Wayne Eleazer and Edward Ellegood, ERAU Space Traffic Management Conference, November 2014

Introduction
On September 22, 2014, Space Exploration Technologies (SpaceX) broke ground on a
new spaceport facility at Boca Chica, a remote beach located east of Brownsville,
Texas, less than three miles north of the U.S./Mexico border. The groundbreaking
followed the successful completion of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) in
coordination with the Federal Aviation Administration’s Office of Commercial Space
Transportation (FAA-AST), and the commitment of millions of dollars in financial
assistance from Texas state and local governments.
In addition to purely environmental/ecological impacts, the EIS focused on some
other public safety risks, all of which were found to be acceptable with mitigating
actions proposed by SpaceX.
The EIS was an important step toward gaining community and state/local government
support for the Boca Chica spaceport. The successful EIS triggered pledges of about
$30 million in financial incentives that SpaceX plans to leverage to develop and
operate the spaceport, a project expected to cost in excess of $100 million over
several years. SpaceX has pledged to create a minimum of 100 full-time jobs, with a
payroll of at least $24.75 million over five years.
But the EIS did not cover many of the broader technical, operational and public safety
requirements established by FAA-AST for issuing a Launch Site Operator License
(commonly called a “spaceport license”) or Launch Licenses for the Falcon-9 and
Falcon-Heavy vehicles that would take-off and potentially land at Boca Chica. This
paper focuses on the challenges faced by SpaceX (and other potential South Texas
launchers) as they pursue these FAA licenses.

Hazard Types
Briefly summarized, the types of hazards associated with space launches are:
Distance-Focusing Overpressure: The detonation of rocket propellants can produce
a ‘blast overpressure’ shock wave that can damage structures and injure people.
Debris Impact Hazard: Falling vehicle components and payloads from failed launch
attempts, or debris from their aerodynamic or commanded breakup, can damage
aircraft in flight and structures on the ground as well as injure individuals. In
addition, some debris may detonate on impact, producing a Blast Hazard, or may act
as firebrands to initiate fires on impact.
Toxic Effluent Exposure: Toxic propellants as well as the chemical byproducts
associated with the burning of propellants can injure people on the ground. This is
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chiefly associated with toxic liquid rocket propellants and gaseous plumes from solid
rocket motors as they burn, explode or break up in flight.
All of these types are a possible for Falcon vehicles launched from Boca Chica, and for
vertical landings at the spaceport or further downrange. However, toxic hazards likely
will be relatively small since the Falcon does not use highly toxic propellants or solid
rocket motors. The payloads may use such propellants, but in relatively small
quantities.
The area near the launch pad
experiences the highest potential for
damage. At liftoff and in the very
early stages of flight the vehicle has
both the largest amount of
propellant on board and the
maximum structure that can produce
debris. A large Flight Hazard Area is
required to accommodate a potential
failure or range-initiated flight
termination at this point in a mission.
Figure 1 shows a blast zone (yellow)
surrounding the Boca Chica launch
pad. As described in public meetings
in advance of the EIS, this is a 1.5
mile circle around the launch pad
that would be cleared of nonessential
personnel in advance of launch
operations or whenever the vehicle is
loaded with its propellants on the launch pad. Also shown in Figure 1 is a water
closure area that was described in the EIS (and extending only to the U.S./Mexico
border at the mouth of the Rio Grande).

A Look Downrange
SpaceX’s intent for building the Boca Chica spaceport is to accommodate commercial
launches of geosynchronous-orbit (GEO) satellites. With populated landmasses to the
northeast and southeast, Boca Chica cannot readily support missions to higher
inclination orbits, like those flown from Cape Canaveral to the International Space
Station.
From Boca Chica, to avoid overflight of most landmasses, launches can follow narrow
over-water paths between Florida and Cuba or between Mexico’s Yucatan Peninsula
and Cuba (see Figure 2) before requiring “dogleg” turns to avoid landmasses further
downrange.
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A 93- to 95-degree launch azimuth would take the vehicle over the Florida Straits (the
gap between Florida and Cuba). At 93-degrees, this is close to the launch azimuth
often used for commercial and government GEO missions from the Cape Canaveral
Spaceport.

A 93-degree trajectory would also take the vehicle over Andros Island, the largest
island in the Bahamas Archipelago, as well as over some of the smaller islands
downrange. Andros Island has a population of approximately 8,000 people, which may
increase significantly during festivals and local events. A 95-degree trajectory will
miss Andros Island on the south side but will place the track closer to Cuba. Suitable
analysis will be required to determine if the casualty probabilities for the area will be
acceptable.
An azimuth of about 112-degrees would take the vehicle between Cuba and the
Yucatan Peninsula and generally over the island of Jamaica. This may be feasible in
terms of overflight risks, but it would require a performance-reducing dogleg turn to
achieve a desired GEO orbit (a 112-degree azimuth would normally produce an orbital
inclination of around 33.9 degrees).
The authors will assume for the remainder of this paper that SpaceX will opt for the
path between Florida and Cuba, though many of the issues raised would also apply to
the Cuba-Yucatan path.
During launch operations, the blast zone becomes part of a Launch Danger Zone that
extends downrange and is restricted for ground, maritime and aviation traffic. For
Falcon-9 launches from Florida, this area reaches out approximately 80 nautical
miles, tapering from around 20 nautical miles wide at the launch site to about 10
nautical miles wide at its eastern end. Figure 3 overlays a typical Falcon-9 Hazard
Area from Cape Canaveral onto Boca Chica. This area -– which would likely be larger
for Falcon-Heavy rockets -– does not address hazards from booster fly-back and
landing.
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The exact splashdown locations for the Falcon first stage and payload fairing
components will have to be determined for each mission. But at Boca Chica, SpaceX
has previously indicated it might choose to fly a more lofted trajectory than is
optimal from a performance standpoint in order to bring the drop/landing areas for
the first stages closer to the launch site. This would impart a performance penalty but
could shrink the downrange Hazard Area (while increasing uprange risks) and facilitate
a closer-to-shore or on-shore recovery of the Falcon’s reusable booster stages (see
Figure 4).
At 26 degrees latitude, Boca Chica would offer a small advantage over Cape
Canaveral, which is situated at 28 degrees. This lower latitude could allow slightly
heavier payloads due to the extra velocity imparted by the Earth’s rotation. However,
this advantage may be negated by any “dogleg” maneuvers designed to avoid
overflight of populated areas, and by the potential need for a higher-elevation
trajectory (shown in Figure 4) to mitigate downrange safety impacts or facilitate
booster-stage recovery.

Evolving Safety Rules
The Air Force, with multiple launch ranges under its purview, has an outstanding
history of managing spaceflight safety and has developed most of the rules and
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procedures that are now codified as FAA regulations for commercial launches and
spaceports. Risk mitigation approaches typically employed (mostly by the Air Force)
include:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Cleared areas, such as Launch Hazard Areas and blast zones around launch pads.
Notices to Airmen and Mariners to advise the public of launch hazards for a
particular time period.
Active control and surveillance of the launch hazard areas using radar and visual
observation by patrolling ships and aircraft.
Monitoring vehicle flight performance and trajectory to confirm it is operating
within acceptable parameters.
Initiation of Flight Termination action when the rocket veers off course.

Several regulatory requirements depend on mathematical calculations of “expectation
of casualty” (Ec) from launch or re-entry failures. These calculations are based on a
variety of vehicle and operational factors, sometimes with competing analyses offered
by the regulators and the launch companies. FAA-AST now seeks to ease their Ec
requirements, which may provide greater access to launch licenses for the growing
variety of launch and re-entry systems now under development.
Current overall Ec limits for commercial launch licenses are set at thirty-in-a-million
(potential for 30 ‘level-3’ injuries among a million people exposed to the risk). Draft
changes requested by the FAA would establish a one-in-ten-thousand Ec limit for both
launches and re-entries. Specifically for aircraft and maritime vessels, the Ec limits
would be one-in-a-million and one-in-one-hundred-thousand, respectively.
Air Force and FAA safety regulations require that the Launch Hazard Area be
sufficiently cleared of air and maritime traffic before launches can occur. This
requires government-issued Notices to Airmen (NOTAM) and Notices to Mariners
(NTM), but these warnings aren’t always heeded. Hazard Area encroachment is a
recurring and costly problem at other spaceports and must be dealt with at Boca
Chica without direct support from Air Force or NASA.

Far Downrange Risks
One significant problem with the Boca Chica site is that, unlike Cape Canaveral, there
are multiple populated land masses only about 900 miles downrange from the launch
site. Assuming the likely launch azimuth to be used by SpaceX, these far-downrange
areas include South Florida, several small Bahamian islands, and Cuba (see Figure 2).
Infrequently, launch failures occur long after the vehicle has left the Launch Hazard
Area and is well out of sight from the viewing stands. Engine failures toward the end
of first-stage flight, a botched stage separation, or an upper-stage malfunction can
cause an inability to reach orbital velocity or a vehicle breakup. With Boca Chica
launches, if this occurs over certain areas of the Gulf of Mexico and with certain wind
or uncontrolled propulsion conditions, the debris hazard could significantly affect the
populated areas downrange.
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Protection of these downrange areas would require the definition of allowable
trajectory limits beyond which the flight would have to be terminated. This would be
especially challenging in areas where the nominal trajectory might be in close
proximity to land, such as southern Florida and Cuba.
Established trajectory limits would have to account for the post-termination paths of
vehicle and payload debris in order to properly protect land areas. In the Straits of
Florida, these land areas are separated by only about 120 nautical miles, not including
any islands, and thus would result in a very narrow corridor. The protection limits
would further narrow the corridor and reduce range safety decision times.

Maritime Traffic Safety
The Gulf of Mexico is a popular location for maritime travel. At Boca Chica (like at
Cape Canaveral) the offshore area hosts recreational and commercial fishing vessels
that must be sufficiently cleared via NTM from the Hazard Area during launches. In
the EIS, SpaceX indicated it
would work with the U.S. Coast
Guard to accomplish this. One
complicating factor is the
requirement to coordinate also
with Mexican authorities as the
Hazard Area encroaches
Mexican territorial waters (see
Figure 3).
Further offshore and
downrange, the Gulf sees
steady traffic by huge oil
tankers, container ships, cruise
ships, and smaller cargo
vessels heading to major ports
in the five U.S. Gulf states,
Mexico and other Caribbean
nations (see Figure 5). Some of
this traffic would be
endangered (albeit very
remotely) by falling rocket stages and fairings, though possibly not enough to require
mitigation efforts.
In addition to maritime vessels, there are around 6,500 oil exploration, drilling and
pumping platforms in the Gulf of Mexico (see Figure 6). Although there are only a few
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oil platforms near Boca Chica,
associated safety issues will have to
be addressed for any located within
the Launch Hazard Area. Evacuation
of the platforms during launch
operations is one option, but at the
Western Range, with some launches
from Vandenberg Air Force Base in
California, the problem has been
handled with hold-harmless
agreements and hazard notifications.
For Falcon-9 launches from Cape
Canaveral to geosynchronous orbits,
the first-stage and payload fairing
impact areas are along the trajectory
beginning about 358 nautical miles
east from the launch site and
continuing out an additional 207 nautical miles. Transposing these drop zones onto an
easterly flight path from Boca Chica (shown in red on Figures 2, 5, 6 and 7) reveals
that hazards will be present for vessels that traverse the area during launch
operations.

Air Traffic Safety
The Boca Chica EIS
states that SpaceX
will coordinate its
launches with the
FAA’s Houston Air
Route Traffic
Control Center,
and with Mexico’s
Secretariat of
Communications
and
Transportation to
enable airspace
clearances and
traffic routing.
Launches from the
Cape Canaveral
Spaceport are
coordinated with
the FAA’s Miami
Air Route Traffic
7

Control Center, which is responsible for rerouting aircraft that typically use a coasthugging north/south route connecting South Florida to destinations in the
northeastern U.S. and Europe. Airlines dislike this rerouting because of added fuel
costs and schedule delays for shifting to an inland route west of the spaceport.
Launches from Boca Chica will face a more complex airspace situation, with multiple
corridors crossing the Gulf of Mexico between the U.S. and Central and South America
(see Figure 7). These routes are managed by multiple domestic and international
control centers, and re-routing them will not be as simple as moving traffic to the
west of the spaceport, as is done in Florida.

Range Tracking and Telemetry
At present it is not clear how launch vehicle performance will be monitored during
missions from Boca Chica, or how flight-termination action will be commanded. The
Eastern Range has a tracking station at the Jonathan Dickenson Missile Tracking Annex
(JDMTA) that may be able to provide support during the latter stages of flight from
Boca Chica, but the JDMTA station will not be able to cover the entire trajectory.
There are other alternatives, including ship-based tracking radars or assets potentially
available in Cuba or the Yucatan Peninsula, but newer approaches could prove more
cost effective for SpaceX. GPS-based metric tracking systems and the FAA-backed
Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) system could eliminate the
need for some of the higher-cost approaches currently used by the Air Force.
The Boca Chica EIS mentions the STARGATE partnership between SpaceX and the
University of Texas-Brownsville, which appears aimed at providing a phased-array
radar tracking capability near the Boca Chica launch site. Funded initially with state
and federal grants to promote STARGATE’s economic and academic development
potential, the project would be located
near the Boca Chica launch site and could
support both launch and landing operations,
as well as weather monitoring (see Figure
8). This would probably not, however, serve
far-downrange requirements.
Of equal importance to the tracking task is
real-time range safety decision making.
U.S. launch ranges employ Missile Flight
Control Officers to determine if a vehicle’s
flight should be terminated based on
position and performance data. The
primary concern is to prevent an explosive
impact in a populated area, as well as to prevent the vehicle from proceeding along
an unacceptable flight path.
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Flight Termination Action can involve either commanding the vehicle’s engines to
shut down or triggering an explosive breakup of the vehicle. As with tracking
technologies, the flight termination requirement could be met with new technologies
(specifically, Autonomous Flight Safety Systems) that are now being tested by the Air
Force and NASA and could reduce costs. Redundancy is a requirement for these
systems, to ensure public safety in the event that one system fails.

Terrestrial Weather and Climate
Weather constraints are the most common cause of launch delays. High ground-level
winds may result in the vehicle being tipped over or cause excessive drift during the
vehicle’s ascent, perhaps causing contact with structures on the launch pad. High
winds aloft can cause structural overload or overpower the vehicle’s control system.
Lightning or in-flight charging of the structure can damage vehicle electronics.
Weather also has an impact on real-time safety analyses. Winds at ground level or
aloft can significantly shift the hazard zones for debris or toxic fumes (including into
Mexican territory). Lightning can not only damage the vehicle’s electronics but also
disable its flight termination systems. The result is that conditions may be acceptable
from the launch vehicle standpoint but unacceptable from a safety perspective.
Because weather is such an important factor, elaborate monitoring systems combined
with highly trained meteorological experts are key elements of the support provided
at Air Force and NASA spaceports. It is not clear how comparable capabilities will be
provided at the Boca Chica launch site.
In some respects the typical weather conditions around Boca Chica appear more
favorable than Cape Canaveral, with a lower preponderance of afternoon
thunderstorms during the summer months and a less corrosive salt-air environment
(which increases costs for launch pad maintenance).
But while Florida launches sometimes suffer from too much water (rain), Texas is in
the midst of a historically severe drought. Although SpaceX plans to store fresh water
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in a tower near its Boca Chica launch pad, it will have to be delivered in trucks and it
may become a challenge to keep a sufficient supply on hand to support back-to-back
launch attempts. During a rocket’s liftoff, this “deluge water” is poured onto the pad
in great quantities (up to 200,000 gallons for a Falcon-Heavy launch) for sound and
vibration suppression.
HURRICANES – The Boca Chica EIS states that “since 1851, 63 hurricanes, or one every
three years, have hit the Gulf Coast of Texas… Since 2000, 13 named hurricanes and
tropical storms have affected the Texas coast.” Figure 9 shows the coastal risk areas
and damages these storms can cause. Of course, Florida is also no stranger to
hurricanes (see Figure 10). According to the Tropical Meteorology Research Project,
Cameron County (home to Boca
Chica) had a 7.8% probability of a
major hurricane impact during the
2014 season, while Brevard County
(home to Cape Canaveral) had a
14.2% probability.
Aerial photographs of the Boca
Chica site seem to show a history
of tidal surge beyond the current
high-tide line and into the dunes
surrounding the proposed launch
site. The launch site and related
structures are also located within
a 100-year floodplain. SpaceX will
therefore build a raised foundation
for its launch complex, although some support facilities will remain at their current
elevation. Of course, the structures will be built to comply with -- and probably
exceed –- storm wind ratings. But a sufficiently strong hurricane could still cause
major wind and wave damage at the site, including by eroding away the beach
surrounding the site, and washing away access roads and non-elevated facilities.

Space Environment Safety
In Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations, CFR 417.231, now requires a Collision
Avoidance Analysis (COLA) as part of the commercial launch licensure process. This is
designed to prevent a rocket or its payload from impacting other objects in space as
during a launch operation.
Launch providers and spacecraft operators now must allow a 200 kilometer distance
for human-rated vehicles from any in-space objects that represent an impact hazard.
In addition to ensuring the safety of human spaceflight systems, the COLA mitigates
the potential for creating dangerous new orbital debris. The requirement, which has
caused minor delays in some recent launch campaigns, can be met at Boca Chica by
coordinating with the U.S. Space Surveillance Network, a tracking service managed by
the U.S. Strategic Command of the Department of Defense.
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Another emerging issue of concern to both space traffic regulators and launch
companies is “space weather.” This refers to hazardous radiation conditions caused
by solar phenomena that can cause
payload and launch vehicle electronics
to malfunction (see Figure 11). Some
experts consider meteor showers and
similar non-radiation phenomena to be
within the definition of space weather.
The FAA’s position on space weather is
evolving and has been a topic of
discussion within the Commercial
Space Transportation Advisory Committee (COMSTAC), which provides advice to the
FAA on policy and regulatory issues.

International Factors
MEXICO -- The Boca Chica launch site is less than three miles north of the
U.S./Mexico border. For Falcon rockets launching from the Cape Canaveral Spaceport,
the Launch Hazard Area can extend more than ten miles to the north and south of the
pad and then further out downrange. The Boca Chica Launch Hazard Area will
therefore likely encroach into the Mexican state of Tamaulipas, Mexican territorial
waters (which extend 12 nautical miles east from the U.S./Mexico border), and
Mexican airspace.
In the Boca Chica EIS, SpaceX indicated it would coordinate with Mexico’s Secretariat
of Communications and Transportation on launch notifications. Aside from this, the
impact of Boca Chica launch operations on Mexican public safety does not appear to
have been addressed in great detail in the EIS.
It is unclear how affected Mexican federal and state agencies (including the Mexican
Navy) will respond to the launch safety impacts and whether they will have a role or
concerns about hazard-area clearance on land and in the water downrange. This may
become an issue of concern for
Mexicans who hope to get upclose launch viewing from the
Rio Grande shoreline or from
boats in the Gulf.
Tamaulipas has also gained a
reputation for extremely violent
criminal activity (see Figure 12),
ranging from kidnappings, human
trafficking and murder to
extortion, corruption and
narcotics. Organized crime
syndicates like the Zetas and the
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Gulf Cartel have been battling for control of the region, and the violence has been
spilling over the border into southeast Texas. Security of flight hardware, data,
personnel and facilities at the Boca Chica launch site may become an issue of concern
for SpaceX.
CUBA -- On November 30, 1960, a Thor DM-21 rocket (a predecessor to today’s Delta
rockets) malfunctioned after launch from Cape Canaveral’s Launch Complex 17. The
first stage was destroyed by a Range Safety Officer but the second stage flew
uncontrolled and fell on Cuba, killing a cow (see Figure 13). Fidel Castro called it an
act of “imperialist aggression” and received a $2 million settlement from the U.S.
Government Castro sold parts of the recovered propulsion system to China to support
their development of intercontinental missiles.
(A similar incident over a decade earlier highlighted the
public safety risks of rocket launches and led to the
creation of the Eastern Range. In May 1947, a Hermes II
rocket (a modified Nazi V-2) veered off course from its
White Sands launch site in New Mexico, flying 100 miles
over the city of El Paso before crashing in Mexico south
of Juarez.)
Nominal SpaceX launches will probably reach low-Earthorbit altitudes before they pass over the Straits of
Florida, but Cuba may rightfully worry that another
debris incident is possible for launches that fail to
achieve orbit. Depending on winds aloft and other
factors, upper stage and/or payload hardware from a
failed launch could fall into Cuban airspace and onto the
island’s populated areas.
Given the history of sour diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Cuba, the Cuban
government could raise overflight safety concerns that would require responses from
the FAA and the U.S. Department of State. Other concerns could arise among U.S.
trade partners concerned about the impact of launch operations on international
maritime and aviation traffic in and over the Gulf of Mexico.
MULTINATIONAL – Space launches can sometimes be mistaken for hostile missile
launches. To avoid confusion and to ensure compliance with other obligations, the
United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) requests that member states
provide notifications of launch operations. Meanwhile, the U.S. government has
separately agreed to notify other nations, like Russia, before space launches are
conducted.
At Boca Chica, SpaceX will have to work through the FAA, which would coordinate
with the U.S. Department of State to advise UNOOSA and other individual nations
(with likely emphasis on those situated immediately downrange) of upcoming
launches.
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Another potential international issue could involve the recovery by Cuba and other
Gulf and Caribbean nations of rocket and satellite hardware presently covered under
ITAR or the Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR). Spent booster stages that aren’t
recovered by SpaceX, and high-tech components
that might fall into the sea after a failed launch,
could drift with prevailing currents onto beaches
in Cuba or other nations (see Figure 14). The
odds of this happening with SpaceX might be
extremely small, but components from European
Ariane rockets have been known to wash ashore
at multiple Caribbean beaches.

Roles and Responsibilities
Traditionally, space launches have required
highly capable support organizations, not only to
meet the onsite needs of the launch provider but
also to interface properly with the external
world. It typically falls upon the range safety
organizations to provide:







Accurate and detailed weather data and analysis
Assurance that local and downrange safety requirements are met
Notices to, and interface with maritime and aviation traffic
Vehicle and range instrumentation telemetry and data processing
Independent verification and validation to ensure public safety
Initiation of flight termination action, when warranted

The US launch ranges at Cape Canaveral, Vandenberg Air Force Base, and Wallops
Flight Facility (WFF) all have well-established organizations dedicated to meeting
these requirements. In the case of WFF, the advent of much more powerful vehicles,
such as the Minotaur and Antares required an upgrade of range safety analytical
capabilities beyond that which had existed there for decades.
It is possible to launch vehicles without such a supporting organization, the best U.S.
example being Sea Launch launches from that company’s Pacific Ocean platform.
However, in that case the range safety concerns are largely addressed by locating
launches so far from land as to virtually eliminate local and downrange safety issues.
This opportunity does not exist for the Boca Chica launch site, which is far more
constrained than Florida is.
With safety risks that in some cases exceed those faced at existing launch ranges, the
Boca Chica spaceport may require the creation of a formal (and perhaps independent)
launch range to manage them. And just as a launch site is more than merely a launch
pad, a launch range is more than merely tracking and telemetry systems. Key to the
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operation of a launch range are the management, planning, engineering expertise,
operational responsibilities, and safety analysis/oversight functions. Such capabilities
are often overlooked and at times even disparaged by those focused primarily on the
launch activity.
A key question remains as to roles and responsibilities for the Boca Chica launch site.
While the FAA has the responsibility to protect the public from launch hazards, it
lacks the capability. The Air Force and NASA both possess the expertise but do not
have range and analytical assets in place and, in any case, it is not their
responsibility. This “who’s in charge?” issue is one that likely will be addressed in
SpaceX’s applications for FAA launch licenses and launch site operator’s license.

Conclusion
While the successful conclusion of an EIS for the Boca Chica launch site has given
forward momentum to the project, SpaceX, the FAA and other stakeholders have
several non-trivial challenges to resolve before launch operations can be hosted
there.
The authors intended to highlight the broad range of issues that will require attention
as SpaceX proceeds with its plans at Boca Chica. None of these should be viewed as
‘showstoppers’ for Boca Chica, but several will be particularly difficult to mitigate,
and they may – in aggregate – require a refinement of SpaceX’s strategy. The authors
hope the information facilitates planning for this exciting project by SpaceX and other
stakeholders at Boca Chica.
# # #
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